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WIN OR LOSE: RESIDENTIAL SORTING AFTER
A SCHOOL CHOICE LOTTERY
Andrew Bibler and Stephen B. Billings*
Abstract—We examine residential relocation and opting out of the public
school system in response to school choice lottery outcomes. We show that
rising kindergartners and sixth graders who lose a school choice lottery are
6 percentage points more likely to exit the district or change neighborhood
schools (20% to 30% increase) and make up 0.14 to 0.35 standard deviations
in average school test scores between lottery assignment and attendance the
following year. Using hedonic-based estimates of land prices, we estimate
that lottery losers pay a 9% to 11% housing price premium for access to a
school with a 1 standard deviation higher mean test score.
I. Introduction
SCHOOL choice has become a popular tool for publicschool systems to compete with the growing number of
charter and private school options for families. In order to
administer school choice programs, many large and diverse
school districts (e.g., Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, New York,
San Francisco) use lotteries to assign students to oversub-
scribed schools. Over the past two decades, the use of random
school assignment has led to a proliferation of economics and
education research that examines the impact of higher qual-
ity and specialized schools on the academic and behavioral
outcomes of students. These studies find mixed evidence of
winning the lottery on short-term outcomes,1 substantial ben-
efits in long-term outcomes,2 and heterogeneity in impacts
across several dimensions, including student attributes such
as gender, as well as alternative measures of school quality
such as school peers, teachers, and other inputs.
In spite of this sizable literature, little is known about
how lottery participants reallocate housing and neighborhood
consumption in response to school choice lottery outcomes.
Scholars often recognize noncompliance with lottery assign-
ment but do not explicitly examine the behavior of losers
who need to compensate for lower-quality school assign-
ment. Compensation may include moving to a neighborhood
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1For example, end-of-grade test scores (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Wal-
ters, 2018; Cullen, Jacob, & Levitt, 2006; Hoxby & Murarka, 2009; Hast-
ings, Kane, & Staiger, 2006; Mills & Wolf, 2017), and self-reported disci-
plinary issues (Cullen et al., 2006).
2For example, adult crime (Deming, 2011) and high school graduation
and college matriculation (Deming et al., 2014).
with higher assigned school quality, switching from public
to private schooling, or moving to another public school dis-
trict.3 The cost of this compensation is nontrivial, with pri-
vate school tuition averaging over $11,000 a year (Snyder, de
Brey, & Dillow, 2016) and homes assigned to higher-quality
schools commanding price premiums that approach the cost
of private schooling.4 The research presented here examines
residential mobility and changes in school quality for lottery
winners and losers that occur between lottery school assign-
ment and actual school attended in the following year.
Results provide two new insights. First, we show that lot-
tery outcomes have an impact on residential mobility and es-
timate the degree to which lottery losers reduce the gap in as-
signed school quality between winners and losers by moving
to better-quality neighborhood schools. Second, we provide
a new estimate of the value of school quality by examining
incurred home price differentials to improve school quality.
Thus, we provide an estimate of the value of school quality for
a population that has strong preferences for school quality
and an immediate need to purchase more school quality.
This method for estimating school quality should be less
sensitive to other neighborhood attributes as families have
a clear need to move explicitly for access to a higher-quality
residentially assigned school. Relocation choices of winners
also provide insight into housing consumption reallocation
after gaining access to a higher-quality school.
We use the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) open
enrollment program school choice lottery, which has been
incorporated into a number of previous works (Hastings &
Weinstein, 2008; Hastings et al., 2005; Deming, 2011; Dem-
ing et al., 2014; Bibler, forthcoming). CMS began assign-
ing students to oversubscribed schools through this lottery in
2002 after the end of racial-based busing. CMS is a large,
urban school district, and its school choice lottery provides a
number of options, including specialized magnet programs,
at all levels of primary education. We limit our analysis to ap-
plicants to oversubscribed lotteries in CMS in order to com-
pare lottery winners and losers from the same lottery across
a number of outcomes. Traditionally, school lottery papers
provide two types of estimates. First, one can estimate an
intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of winning the lottery on various
outcomes. Second, one could use lottery assignment to es-
timate a local average treatment effect (LATE) on various
academic and behavioral outcomes for students who com-
ply with lottery assignment. The difference between these
3Losers may also compensate in smaller ways through tutoring or parental
involvement in the classroom.
4Housing price premiums for homes with good schools can be sizable
based on the higher-end estimates of the value of a standard deviation im-
provement in school quality (upward of 10%; Nguyen-Hoang & Yinger,
2011) applied to expensive homes (over $500,000).
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two estimators includes the endogenous reaction of students
to the lottery results. The fact that winners and losers have
different needs to alter school quality after the lottery is the
focus of our analysis.
We find that rising kindergarten and sixth-grade students
who lose a school choice lottery are about 6 percentage
points more likely to exit the district or change neighbor-
hood schools, a 20% to 30% increase over baseline moving
probabilities. These changes in mobility are almost entirely
driven by exiting the public school system for kindergart-
ners, but in relocating to a different neighborhood within the
school district for sixth graders. Rising kindergartners and
sixth graders who lost the lottery and change neighborhood
schools make up between 0.22 and 0.43 standard deviations
in average school test scores between lottery assignment and
attendance the following year.5 Consistent with postlottery
sorting based on student composition, we find that kinder-
garten lottery losers move to schools with a lower proportion
of economically disadvantaged students and a higher pro-
portion of white students, even after controlling for school
quality. Given the link between neighborhood of residence
and school assignment, sorting based on student composition
may increase residential segregation more broadly. However,
this sorting pattern does not hold for rising sixth-grade lot-
tery losers, which may be consistent with weaker preferences
for student composition in more experienced public school
students.6 For the smaller sample of winners who move, we
find limited evidence of sorting based on neighborhood home
prices or moving for proximity to their first-choice school.
Our results complement previous literature on the nonmar-
ket valuation of school quality, which estimates a 2% to 10%
increase in home values for a 1 standard deviation increase
in school quality (Black, 1999; Andreyeva & Patrick, 2017;
Figlio & Lucas, 2004; Dhar & Ross, 2012).7 We first ver-
ify that a standard boundary discontinuity estimate using our
data and study area provides results in the range of the prior
literature—a 7% premium in housing prices for a 1 SD in-
crease in school quality.8 We also show a larger premium for
the highest-quality school neighborhoods. We then estimate
how changes in school quality for losers and winners relate
to changes in neighborhood housing prices (conditional on
structural and nonschool neighborhood attributes). Using lot-
tery losers who move, we estimate a housing price premium
of 11% for kindergartners and 9% for 6th graders for a 1 SD
5In both samples, the improvement in school quality for lottery losers who
move is like going from the 25th percentile to the median school or from
the 75th percentile to a school in the 90th percentile in terms of quality.
6While sixth-grade lottery losers also move to schools with a lower pro-
portion of economically disadvantaged students and a higher proportion of
white students, the correlation is not statistically different from zero after
conditioning on changes in school quality.
7This literature typically focuses on school quality measures that are based
on test scores, but Clapp, Nanda, and Ross (2008) and Cellini, Ferreira,
and Rothstein (2010) suggest that other school-level attributes, including
demographics and infrastructure, are also capitalized in property values.
8Most of the recent literature places estimates closer to 2% to 4%, but
the large diversity in school quality within our study area may explain our
higher estimates.
increase in test scores. Our large estimates for school quality
using lottery losers are quite plausible for two reasons. First,
lottery applicants are living in neighborhoods with average
school quality to begin with; thus, increasing school quality
by 1 SD would represent moving from an average school to
one of the best schools in the district. Thus, there may be a
substantial premium for this level of school quality.9 Second,
these estimates of the value of school quality are specifically
for neighborhoods chosen by families with a strong and im-
mediate need to improve school quality, which may generate
substantial housing price premiums.
Our work also complements recent empirical evidence that
households with strong preferences for school quality re-
spond to changes in school choice through residential lo-
cation decisions (Billings, Brunner, & Ross, 2018; Brun-
ner, Cho, & Reback, 2012; Cullen, Long, & Reback, 2013;
Schwartz, Voicus, & Horn, 2014). For example, Billings
et al. (2018) show that households gentrify neighborhoods
assigned to failing schools when they are allowed to opt out
of their neighborhood school under No Child Left Behind.
Cullen et al. (2013) and Cortes and Friedson (2014) find that
households strategically move to neighborhoods located in
lower-performing school attendance zones in order to im-
prove their odds of qualifying for the Texas Top Ten Per-
cent Plan. There are also a number of recent papers (Tuttle,
Gleason, & Clark, 2012; Hanushek et al., 2007; Chabrier,
Cohodes, & Oreopoulos, 2016; Baude et al., 2014) that ex-
amine the introduction and growth of charter schools and
discuss residential movement of families in the presence of
expanded choice due to charter schools. Together, this work
provides empirical evidence of theoretical assumptions and
models used in Ferreyra (2007) and Nechyba (2000) to ex-
plain residential sorting based on school quality. In our con-
text, lottery losers have a strong incentive to relocate to im-
prove school quality, and based on their strong preferences
for school quality revealed by participating in the lottery,
this work predicts residential relocation. Also consistent with
these sorting models, winners may prefer moving to a lower-
priced neighborhood since they no longer have to choose
their neighborhood and school simultaneously. More broadly,
a better understanding of how school choice policies affect
residential location decisions will provide insight into the
design of school choice programs.
Our results have important and timely implications for ed-
ucation policy as states and cities expand and refine their
school choice systems (Jordan & Gallagher, 2015). Often,
little attention is paid to lottery losers who may be incurring
substantial costs to improve school quality, and thus policy-
makers may want to expand popular school choice options to
minimize the number of families denied access to a school due
to capacity constraints. Additionally, our higher estimates of
the willingness to pay for school quality point to substantial
heterogeneity in the value families place on school quality
9This finding is consistent with Ries and Somerville (2010), who find
nonlinear impacts of school quality on property values in Vancouver.
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and suggest that families with strong school preference and
those coming from relatively high-performing schools likely
have nonlinear or larger marginal benefits from improving
school quality. While our results cannot speak to the optimal
distribution of school quality within a school district, they
show that parents are willing to incur large costs for access to
high-quality schools. Given these costs, there may be large re-
turns to public investments that expand access to high-quality
or specialized magnet school programs.
II. Lottery
Every student enrolled in Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools
(CMS) is assigned to a neighborhood (home) school based
on geographic boundaries.10 CMS students can opt out of
their neighborhood school through a centralized lottery, for
which they can submit up to three program choices in or-
der of preference. Nonguaranteed seats are assigned in three
rounds.11 Only first choices are considered in the first round.
If there are fewer applicants than seats available to a given
program, then all of the applicants to that program will be
assigned to their first choice.12 We focus on oversubscribed
programs because identification comes from comparing win-
ners and losers from the same lottery. When the number of
applicants is greater than the number of available seats (the
choice is oversubscribed), seats are assigned quasi-randomly.
Seat assignment is not completely random, because the prob-
ability of winning for a particular student depends on that
person’s priority group. “Priority groups” refer to sets of stu-
dents who meet some prespecified criteria. Over our sam-
ple period, priorities were based on geographic location and
whether the student’s neighborhood school is a Title I choice
school.13 We use lottery (program of application by year)
fixed effects and condition on other lottery rules to exploit
the fact that winners should be randomly chosen within these
groups.14
Our identification strategy relies on comparing students
in the same priority groups who have different lottery out-
comes. After going through all first choices, second and then
10We use the terms neighborhood school and home school interchangeably
to refer to the school that the student is assigned to based on location of
residence, which is the school he or she would attend unless the family opts
out through the lottery, relocates, or exits the district.
11Students with an older sibling in a school are guaranteed a seat in that
school by making it their first choice.
12We use the term program rather than school since students apply for
specific grades as well as special magnet programs that encompass only a
portion of classrooms in a school.
13Title I schools are those with a high percentage of economically dis-
advantaged students. A Title I school becomes a Title I choice school if it
fails to meet adequate yearly progress in the same subject for two consec-
utive years. No Child Left Behind (NCLB) required that the district allow
students assigned to Title I choice schools the opportunity to attend a non–
Title I choice school, but it does not require the district to allow students to
choose the school they are offered.
14In addition to priority groups, all applicants are ordered based on ran-
domly assigned numbers. When a choice is oversubscribed, the combination
of priority groups and randomly assigned numbers determines who wins
the lottery.
third choices are considered in a similar fashion. If a stu-
dent’s second or third choice filled up in a previous round,
he or she remains unassigned in that round. If a student does
not win any of the three choices, he or she is assigned to the
neighborhood school. The lottery considers student choices
in sequence, so students are most likely to win a choice by
picking it first, and almost all seats are awarded in the first
round. The treatment assignment variable is a dummy vari-
able for winning first choice, which should be random after
conditioning on the lottery fixed effects and rules.
The data contain up to three choices for every student in or-
der of preference, as well as sibling placement, Title I choice
placement, economic disadvantage status, and transportation
zone.15 We start with the sample of all applicants without a
guaranteed seat and proceed in the following way. We gener-
ate lottery fixed effects as the program-by-year combinations.
We proxy for Title I choice school using whether any student
from his or her neighborhood school was placed under the
Title I choice option that year. In all specifications, we con-
dition on lottery fixed effects, Title I choice school status by
year, and economic disadvantage status by year.
In addition to conditioning on lottery rules, we must also
consider the stated requirements for specific lottery pro-
grams. This is mainly a concern for the sixth-grade sam-
ple, for which some programs restrict access to students who
meet certain requirements. These requirements are generally
based on whether the student scored at grade level or higher
on end-of-grade exams in the prior year. For example, stu-
dents who wish to enter one of the STEM programs in sixth
grade must score at grade level in reading, math, and science
on his or her fifth-grade end-of-grade exams. In this case, we
can check whether each student met the stated requirements
for the program applied to with his or her first choice in the
lottery. We restrict to students who met the requirements for
their first-choice program.16 Appendix table A1 provides a
breakdown of the portion of applicants who won access to
an oversubscribed school by lottery application year. The av-
erage share of applicants who won their first choice in each
year is about 42% for rising kindergartners and 48% for ris-
ing sixth graders over our sample period of 2009 to 2012, but
there is some heterogeneity across years. The year-to-year
variation in win probabilities does limit the ability of appli-
cants (especially rising sixth graders) to accurately predict
probabilities from past results.
15CMS stopped reporting economic disadvantage after 2010. For the years
2011 and 2012, we proxy for economic disadvantage at the time of appli-
cation using economic disadvantage status from the North Carolina Educa-
tion Research Data Center (NCERDC) data. For kindergarten students, the
economic disadvantage proxy comes from their third-grade observation in
NCERDC. For rising sixth-grade students, we use their lagged (fifth-grade)
value for economic disadvantage.
16In some cases, we cannot view whether the student met the stated re-
quirements. Specifically, arts schools require an audition or portfolio as-
sessment, and leadership schools require an interview. We drop these pro-
grams from the analysis because assignment is not random, conditional on
observables.
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FIGURE 1.—NUMBER OF LOTTERY APPLICATIONS AND PERCENT
WINNERS BY GRADE
This figure provides the number of applicants and the portion of those applicants admitted to their first-
choice school for oversubscribed lotteries by grade for school years 2009 to 2012.
III. Data
To examine residential movement for students who apply
to a school choice lottery, we link student-level data from
the lottery in CMS to data on neighborhood location and stu-
dent demographics provided by the North Carolina Education
Research Data Center (NCERDC). These data are unique in
that they allow us to define residential location for students
based on geographic attendance boundaries for school as-
signment (home school) during the lottery application time
period (the year prior to kindergarten and the fifth-grade year)
as well as the following year (K and sixth grade). For fifth and
sixth graders, we can also determine the Census Block Group
(CBG) of residence.17 Therefore, we can observe any changes
in residential location across neighborhoods or school as-
signment zones or both. The home school is the one that
a student will be assigned to in the following year, unless
he or she opts out through the lottery or changes residence
and moves into the boundary of a different school. NCERDC
linked the lottery data from CMS with statewide education
data, which provides additional information on end-of-grade
exam scores, third- through eighth-grade CBG of residence,
and student demographic data.18
Even though we focus our analysis on rising kindergartners
and sixth graders, parents may apply in other grades to fill
spots in undersubscribed schools or seats left open by depart-
ing children in oversubscribed schools. As shown in figure
1, most lottery applications are in school transition years (K
and sixth grade). First grade is the only nontransition grade
17We use CBG 2000 or 2010 depending on the year of observation.
18NCERDC was able to link between 93% and 97% of all observations
from the CMS data in each year. Even though in previous work, Billings
et al. (2018) incorporated exact student addresses, these data could not be
incorporated into this study due to CMS restrictions in providing the lottery
data. Additionally, all end-of-grade exams are scaled to have mean 0 and
standard deviation of 1 based on statewide testing results for each grade
and year.
generating a nontrivial number of applications.19 This oc-
curs in part because access to certain magnet schools is more
restricted in higher grades, fewer seats are available in pre-
ferred schools in later grades, and families become less likely
to switch schools as students progress through a school.
Our analysis focuses on students entering kindergarten and
sixth grade from the 2008–2009 through 2011–2012 school
years who submitted an application for a program in the CMS
school choice lottery and were linked from the CMS data to
the NCERDC data. For the kindergarten lottery sample, we
are limited to CMS lottery data.20 For the sixth-grade sample,
we include a combination of the CMS lottery data, and the
NCERDC data, which provides a richer set of covariates. We
restrict our lottery sample to students who made at least one
choice in the 2009–2012 lotteries, did not receive a sibling
placement, and applied to a program-year for which at least
one individual won and one lost the lottery. We then drop stu-
dents who applied to a program at their neighborhood school,
applied to a program for which they did not meet the entrance
requirement, or applied to a program with subjective entrance
requirements. For the sixth-grade sample, we also restrict to
those with a lagged observation from the NCERDC data.
Even though lottery applicants may apply to neighborhood
schools outside their neighborhood, these schools often have
limited excess seats available for choice. Therefore, 94% of
our kindergarten and 80% of our sixth-grade sample are mag-
net school applications.
We also incorporate detailed data on home attributes
(e.g., beds, baths, lot size, building area). CBG neighbor-
hood attributes (e.g., median household income, population
density) and information on the sale of a property (sales
price, date of sale), which we use to construct neighbor-
hood housing prices by CBG and neighborhood school at-
tendance zones. This data set represents an extract of all
the tax assessor records from Mecklenburg County from
1995 to 2015. We later use all this information to gener-
ate an estimated average value of school quality by condi-
tioning on all of our controls for housing and neighborhood
attributes.
Table 1 summarizes outcomes for rising kindergarten and
sixth-grade students in CMS with breakdowns for winners
and losers in our lottery samples. There is substantial mo-
bility among all rising kindergarten and sixth-grade CMS
students, with 27% of kindergarten students moving by the
following year. These mobility rates are somewhat lower for
lottery applicants given by the “Won” and “Lost” column
headings, which is consistent with a lottery applicant pool
that is economically better off and has better-than-average
19After the analogous sample restrictions to our estimation sample, we
have 1,243 first-grade applicants, of whom 32% of losers and 27% of win-
ners moved within CMS or exited the district. The difference in mobility
between winners and losers is similar in the first-grade and kindergarten
samples. We do not focus on this group in our main analysis because most
of the first-grade applicants (86%) did not apply to an oversubscribed lottery
as rising kindergartners and thus represent a different set of families.
20NCERDC data coverage is low for students in kindergarten through
second grade.
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TABLE 1.—KINDERGARTEN AND SIXTH-GRADE SUMMARY
CMS Won Lost Won − Lost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Kindergarten outcomes
Mover (Change HS + Exit) 0.27 0.20 0.27 −0.070*** −0.068*** −0.053** −0.057**
(0.44) (0.40) (0.44) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
Change HS (Stay) 0.20 0.15 0.18 −0.023 −0.022 −0.007 −0.007
(0.40) (0.36) (0.38) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)
Attend App Year HS 0.55 0.06 0.40 −0.336*** −0.316*** −0.321*** −0.308***
(0.50) (0.24) (0.49) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
Attend First-Choice School 0.16 0.84 0.19 0.651*** 0.636*** 0.642*** 0.656***
(0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.023)
Won Any Choice 0.20 1.00 0.31 0.693*** 0.686*** 0.676*** 0.659***
(0.40) (0.00) (0.46) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Observations 26,966 1,254 1,751 3,005 3,005 3,005 1,693
Sixth-grade outcomes
Mover (Change HS + Exit) 0.24 0.13 0.20 −0.069*** −0.057*** −0.060*** −0.051***
(0.42) (0.34) (0.40) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Change HS (Stay) 0.14 0.11 0.17 −0.062*** −0.054*** −0.057*** −0.051***
(0.34) (0.31) (0.37) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
Attend App Year HS 0.62 0.05 0.38 −0.339*** −0.300*** −0.294*** −0.305***
(0.49) (0.21) (0.49) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.032)
Attend First-Choice School 0.12 0.89 0.31 0.584*** 0.536*** 0.543*** 0.544***
(0.32) (0.31) (0.46) (0.054) (0.049) (0.049) (0.028)
Won Any Choice 0.14 1.00 0.29 0.710*** 0.700*** 0.695*** 0.686***
(0.35) (0.00) (0.45) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 34,686 1,637 1,798 3,435 3,435 3,435 2,540
Program-year FE –
√ √
–
Program-year-neighborhood school FE – – –
√
Neighborhood school FE – –
√
–
Other lottery controls –
√ √ √
HS = home school/neighborhood school. The first column includes all CMS students. Lottery fixed effects are program-by-year (columns 5 and 6) or program-by-year-by HS indicators (column 7). Columns 5 to 7
include controls for lottery priorities (e.g., economic disadvantage, LEP, and assigned Title I Choice HS).
housing stability. Relative to the district averages, lottery ap-
plicants are less likely to be Hispanic or economically dis-
advantaged and have higher end-of-grade exam scores. The
prevalence of 19% of kindergarten losers attending their first-
choice school is mostly due to waitlist entry, but could also
be due to losers moving to the neighborhood zone of a tradi-
tional public school or a partial magnet school (i.e., a school
that admits lottery applicants and has associated geographic
boundaries for residential assignment).
Table 1 also summarizes the lottery applicants by com-
paring the winners and losers. Columns 2 and 3 report aver-
ages for lottery winners and losers, respectively. Columns 4
through 7 test for differences in outcomes between the win-
ners and losers. In column 4, we report unconditional dif-
ferences between winners and losers, while column 5 adds
lottery fixed effects (program of application by year) and con-
trols for other variables that alter the probability of winning
the lottery.21 In addition, we add home school fixed effects
in column 6 to deal with any priority group that is based on
21Other lottery controls include variables to identify priority groups in-
cluding economically disadvantaged status, Title I choice status of assigned
neighborhood school, interaction between economic disadvantage and
Title I choice status, and English second-language eligibility status. For
the sixth-grade sample, we also include dummies for grade-level achieve-
ment, gifted status, and an indicator for being below grade level in reading
and applying to a nonmagnet school.
home school or walk zone.22 Alternatively, column 7 uses lot-
tery fixed effects that are program-by-year-by neighborhood
school indicators.23
The first outcome, Mover (Change HS + Exit), is a dummy
variable indicating whether a student has a different neigh-
borhood school in the following year, which includes those
who exited the school district. The first row in each panel of
table 1 shows the estimates for the effect of winning the lot-
tery on the probability of changing home schools or exiting
CMS. After conditioning on lottery fixed effects (application
choice-by-year of application), adding other covariates has
little impact. For example, from column 5 of table 1, we es-
timate that kindergarten lottery winners are 6.8 percentage
points less likely to exit or change neighborhood schools
conditional on lottery fixed effects and controls. In column
7, which uses application-by-year-by-home school indicators
as lottery fixed effects, we estimate that lottery winners in the
kindergarten sample are 5.7 percentage points less likely to
exit CMS or change neighborhood schools. These estimates
are about 25% of the average moving probability among all
winners and losers.
22Home school fixed effects help control for the existence of an additional
priority for students who live in close proximity to a full magnet school, as
well as priorities given based on larger transportation zones within CMS.
23Because the lottery groups are more restricted in this case, and we
use only lotteries with at least one winner and one loser, the number of
observations falls in column 7 relative to columns 4 to 6.
462 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
The second outcome, Change HS (Stay), is a dummy vari-
able that is equal to 1 for students who show up in the CMS
data the following year with a different home school than
indicated in their application year. This allows us to isolate
how much of the difference in exits plus moves is due to
students who move to a different neighborhood school zone
within CMS. From the top panel in table 1, kindergarten lot-
tery winners are between 0 and 2 percentage points more
likely to remain in the district with a different home school,
indicating that almost the entire win-lose difference in move-
ment between lotteries comes from an increased probability
of exiting for those who lost the lottery. The finding that the
lottery results induce movement through district exits is con-
sistent with students opting out of the public school system
altogether to attend private schools or moving to attend more
suburban school districts, which in this study area contain
higher-quality schools in terms of test scores. However, the
fact that winning the lottery has a much smaller impact on
the probability of moving to a different home school within
the school district does not limit residential sorting in reac-
tion to lottery results. Even if winners and losers move at
the same rate, they might differ in location choices based on
school and neighborhood quality. This could show up as an
intensive margin difference—that is, even though winners are
just as likely to move, they care less about the school quality
in their new neighborhood because they have lotteried out of
that school in favor of their first-choice program.
Finally, the third variable in table 1, Attend App Year HS,
is an indicator equal to 1 for students who attend the school
that was their assigned home school prior to the initial lot-
tery. Students are assigned a home school based on location
of residence at the time of the lottery (e.g., the school year
before entering kindergarten for the kindergarten sample).
From table 1, about 40% of lottery losers in the sample at-
tended their initial home school assignment. There are several
ways in which students who lost the lottery end up attend-
ing a different school: students obtaining their first-choice
school via a waitlist, winning a second or third choice in
the lottery, or changing residence to a different home school
boundary.24 In comparison, only 6% of lottery winners at-
tend their application-year home school assignment. After
conditioning on lottery fixed effects and lottery rules, we find
that lottery winners are about 30 to 32 percentage points less
likely to attend their application-year home school.
The comparable estimates on moving, exiting, and
application-year home school attendance for the sixth-grade
sample are shown in the first three rows of the bottom panel
of table 1. Lottery winners in the sixth-grade sample are 5
to 6 percentage points less likely to change home school or
exit the district, a similar number to that in the kindergarten
24There is also a second lottery in the district that students can apply
through. However, this lottery is typically designed for students who entered
the district too late to participate in the first lottery, and since most seats are
assigned in the first lottery, few oversubscribed schools are still available.
sample. In contrast to the kindergarten sample, the estimated
impact of winning the lottery on staying in the district with
a different home school is almost identical to the impact on
exiting plus moving—about 5 to 6 percentage points. This
result indicates that the entire difference in responses to the
lottery outcomes between winners and losers for the sixth-
grade sample is due to students remaining in the district but
changing home schools between school years. The main dif-
ference between the kindergarten and sixth-grade samples is
that lottery losers in the sixth-grade sample are moving within
the school district rather than exiting the school district. This
sixth-grade result is inconsistent with families applying to
enter a high-quality public school and opting out in favor of
suburban school districts or private schools if they are un-
successful. Sixth-grade families are already invested in the
public school system and may have other children in public
schools, and thus are less likely to switch to a private school
or move to a suburban school district. Similar to the kinder-
garten sample, winning the lottery decreases the probability
of attending their initial home school assignment by about 30
percentage points among the sixth-grade applicants.
Appendix tables A2 and A3 include balance tests for some
baseline characteristics, and F-tests for the joint significance
of student characteristics that should not alter the probability
of winning the lottery. Appendix table A2 includes an F -test
for joint significance of female, black, white, Hispanic, and
whether the student made a second or third choice in the lot-
tery on predicting the lottery outcome for the kindergarten
sample. The p-value when using the program-by-year fixed
effects is 0.47. When using the more restrictive program-by-
year-by-neighborhood school lottery fixed effects in column
7, the p-value for joint significance of these variables is 0.8.
In both cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that stu-
dent characteristics do not explain winning the lottery. In
appendix table A3, we provide similar information for our
sixth-grade sample, and balance tests include additional vari-
ables for lagged elementary achievement and limited English
proficiency (LEP) status. The p-value for joint significance
is around 0.8 with both the basic and more restrictive lot-
tery fixed effects. In both samples, student attributes do not
explain lottery results.
Before we formally analyze how lottery winners and losers
residentially sort, we consider how initial residential location
relates to the schools that families apply to in the lottery. Trav-
eling long distances to school can be costly, and families may
have to provide their own transportation. The location of stu-
dents and magnet schools of varying quality at the time of
application may be important in interpreting the impacts of
lottery results more broadly and in thinking about families on
the margin of applying to the school choice lottery. However,
distance to first-choice school should have no bearing on our
identification strategy since all of our results are conditional
on applying to the lottery and balance results are robust to
including home school fixed effects. Appendix figure A1 pro-
vides an initial check that sixth-grade winners and losers are
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similar in distance to their first-choice school.25 We see mini-
mal differences between winners and losers in the distribution
of distance from a student’s first-choice school and the CBG
of their residence at the time of application. Losers appear
to live slightly farther away from their first-choice school,
which is consistent with students willing to travel farther for
higher-quality schools, which are more oversubscribed in the
lottery (lower probability of winning). Appendix figures A2
and A3 confirm this empirical fact. Appendix figure A2 shows
that there is no relationship between potential gains in school
test scores and distance to first-choice school at the time of
application for schools with high win probabilities (≥ 0.5).
However, appendix figure A3 shows that students are willing
to travel farther to schools with higher test scores if the school
is high-quality in multiple dimensions, as suggested by the
low win probability (< 0.5). In general, these statistics show
that distance matters, but many families are willing to incur
travel costs for a high-quality school.
IV. Methodology
A. Lottery Outcomes, Moving, and School Quality
In this section, we formalize our empirical strategy to di-
rectly test the role of lottery outcomes on assigned and at-
tended school quality, moving, and housing prices in new
neighborhoods. We begin our analysis by estimating the im-
pact of winning the lottery on assigned school quality using
the following specification,
Sasit = αas + βas × Wit + as × Xit + asi + εasit (1)
where Sasit represents the average end-of-grade math and read-
ing exam score in the school that student i was assigned to
in the lottery at time t .26 The assigned school is the final as-
signment that the student received in the lottery. For a student
who won their first choice in the lottery, Sasit is the average
test score at that person’s first-choice school. Similarly, if a
student won his or her second (third) choice, the quality mea-
sure will reflect the quality of the school the student speci-
fied with his or her second (third) choice. In equation (1), Wit
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if student i won his or her
first choice in the lottery, and asi represents program-by-
year fixed effects. Let Xit represent a vector of student-level
characteristics that influence the probability of winning the
lottery, including economically disadvantaged status, assign-
ment to a Title 1 choice school, and grade-level status in
math, reading, and science for sixth-grade students, as well
as student-level characteristics, including sex, race indicators,
and lagged test scores for sixth-grade students. So β̂as rep-
resents the within-lottery difference in average test scores of
assignment schools between winners and losers. If β̂as > 0,
25We focus on rising sixth graders since we have more disaggregate in-
formation on residence relative to rising kindergartners.
26Assignment is made at time t to a school that the student will attend in
time t + 1.
it means that students who won the lottery were assigned to
schools with higher average test scores than the students who
lost the same lotteries and represents a measurement of the
assignment test score advantage of winners.
In our second specification, we replace the left-hand-side
variable in equation (1) with the average test score of the
school that the student actually attended in the following year,
Satit+1. Now the analogous estimator, β̂
at , represents the dif-
ference in average test scores between the schools that the
winners and losers actually attended or the attendance test
score advantage. Similar to β̂as, β̂at > 0 indicates that lottery
winners attend schools with higher average test scores than
those who lost the same lotteries. We then combine the two
measures of school quality to form a third measure of interest,
Si = Sasit − Satit+1, and provide estimates from the following
specification,
Si = α + β × Wit +  × Xit + i + εit , (2)
where Si represents the difference in the average score be-
tween the school that student i was assigned at time t and
the school that student i actually attended at time t + 1. This
will equal 0 for students who attend the school that they were
initially assigned to in the lottery and will be nonzero when
student i attends a different school than he or she was as-
signed in the lottery. Nonzero values of Si come from some
form of noncompliance with lottery assignment. For exam-
ple, a student could be admitted off a waiting to his or her
first-choice school or a family could alter the student’s as-
signed neighborhood school by relocating. In such a case, if
the student attends a new neighborhood school in the follow-
ing year, the average assigned and attended scores will likely
differ.27
In equation (2), β̂ provides a measurement of the school
quality that lottery losers make up between the end of the
lottery assignment and the following year. If β̂ = 0, any
changes in school quality between assignment and attendance
for the lottery losers are offset by equivalent changes for the
lottery winners. This would be true, for example, if every
student complied with his or her initial assignment. In that
case, the assignment and attendance advantage for winners
are equivalent, and lottery losers took no action to compen-
sate for losing the lottery by finding a way into a different
school than they were initially assigned. At the other ex-
treme, if β̂ = β̂as, that suggests that the assignment advan-
tage disappears in the time between lottery assignment and
school attendance in the following year. One way that this
could happen is if every lottery loser attended a school with
equivalent test scores as his or her first-choice school in the
lottery. In that case, there would be no attendance advantage
for lottery winners. When 0 < β̂ < β̂as, there is some reduc-
tion of the assignment gap between the time of assignment
27Unless the student was also assigned to his or her future neighborhood
school in the initial assignment process or in the unlikely event that the as-
signed and attended schools are different schools but have identical average
test scores.
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and attendance. One way that this would occur is from lot-
tery losers attending schools with higher test scores than they
were initially assigned, although it is also possible that lottery
winners attend schools with lower test scores than they were
initially assigned.
We expand on equations (1) and (2) by incorporating the
moving decisions of lottery winners and losers. We focus on
whether the students had a change in their assigned home
school between the time of the lottery and the following
year. We construct a dummy variable to indicate whether a
student changed home schools, movei = I[HSit = HSit+1],
where HSit represents the home (neighborhood) school that
student i was assigned to in year t .28 A change in neighbor-
hood school between lotteries indicates changing residence
because neighborhood schools are assigned based on geo-
graphic boundaries. We use the information on neighborhood
school assignments to estimate versions of equation (2) that
include interaction terms between movei and Wi, which al-
lows us to estimate changes separately for students who win
the lottery and move, win the lottery and stay, lose the lot-
tery and move, and lose the lottery and stay.29 Winners who
comply with their assignment and so have S̃i = 0 are the
reference group in our moving analysis. However, we still
provide estimates for winners who do not comply with their
lottery assignment.
B. Lottery Outcomes, Moving, and Housing Prices
After considering the changes in assigned and attended
school quality between lottery winners and losers, and
movers and stayers, we consider differences in housing prices
by home school zones. We focus on making analogous com-
parisons to the school quality results. That is, we estimate
changes in housing prices for lottery winners and losers who
move after the lottery. The analysis and results are slightly
different in the case of housing prices, because we care about
capitalized school quality, which would be reflected only in
the home price of neighborhoods that have guaranteed access
to a school—namely, a resident’s home school. Therefore, we
focus on neighborhood school boundaries for home schools
that students are geographically assigned to even if the student
attends another school. For the purpose of computing average
neighborhood housing prices, we focus on the neighborhood
school assignments in the year that a student applies for the
kindergarten/sixth-grade lottery and the following year after
the student begins school. We begin by estimating hedonic
housing price regressions for home sales in the county,
Ln(Phst ) = β × Xhst + α × Nhst + δt + εhst , (3)
28Home school assignments in the lottery data in year t refer to the home
school that the student is assigned to for year t + 1, based on location of
current residence.
29For this analysis, we use S̃i = Satit+1 − Sasit as the outcome, which re-
verses the difference from equation (2). Since the focus is on the lottery
losers in this specification, using S̃i helps to compare these estimates for
lottery losers with the estimates based on equation (2).
where Phst represents the sale price of home h in home
school boundary s at time t .30 Xhst represents characteristics
of the home, including lot size, home size, age of the home,
and other structural attributes.31 Nhst represents controls for
neighborhood attributes including CBG 2000 median house-
hold income, population density, and percent unemployed,
as well as distance to the central business district (CBD),
distance to the interstate, indicators for being located on a
busy road and in a floodplain, and distance to a park. δt in-
dicates fixed effects for the year by quarter of sale. We then
average residuals from the housing price regression to the
home school attendance zone to get a measure of the average
unexplained portion of the home sales, which reflects school
quality:
P̃s = ¯̂εs = 1
ns
ns∑
h=1
ε̂hst , (4)
where P̃s represents the average residualized price in home
school boundary s.32 Let P̃sit represent the average residual-
ized price for the home school that student i is assigned to at
time t . In the sample of rising sixth graders, we refine the price
residual calculation by averaging to the CBG-home school
level, which allows us to better control for neighborhood-
specific differences. We estimate housing price residual pa-
rameters for winners and losers who move based on
P̃si = αp + γplost × movei × (1 − Wit ) + γpwon × movei
× Wit + p × Xit + pi + εpit+1, (5)
where P̃si = P̃sit+1 − P̃sit , and γ̂plost and γ̂pwon are estimators
for the change in the average residual sale price in the neigh-
borhood school boundary for those who moved after los-
ing and winning the lottery, respectively. Since we are using
changes in home school assignment to determine movers, the
neighborhood school residual prices vary only for students
who move. Estimates of γplost and γ
p
won based on equation
(5) are relative to nonmovers, for whom the change between
old and new neighborhood average residual prices is 0 by
construction.
Estimates based on equation (5) tell us about changes in
home price residuals but do not directly link the price dif-
ferences to differences in school quality. In order to estimate
the housing premium directly in terms of school quality, we
interact the observed changes in home price residuals with
changes in school quality. This is effectively a slight exten-
sion of equation (5) but allows us to interpret the premium
30In equation (3), t refers to the quarter-year of property sale. Only in
estimating this housing price hedonic model do we use subscript t to refer
to quarter-year of sale. All other models are limited to annual observations
and thus use t to refer to year.
31We include a series of dummies for different structural attributes of a
home, including foundation, heating, air-conditioning, home style, plumb-
ing, and electrical.
32In our analysis, we use a value of P̃s that is fixed over time and represents
average school quality from 2007 to 2013.
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TABLE 2.—LOTTERY OUTCOMES AND SCHOOL QUALITY
Kindergarten Sample Sixth-Grade Sample
Assigned Attended Difference Assigned Attended Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Won 0.294 0.270 0.024 0.507 0.470 0.037
(0.305) (0.333) (0.195) (0.259) (0.311) (0.200)
Lost −0.033 0.089 −0.122 −0.087 0.184 −0.271
(0.364) (0.393) (0.323) (0.443) (0.473) (0.465)
Unconditional difference 0.327 0.181 0.146 0.594 0.286 0.308
(0.052) (0.047) (0.014) (0.048) (0.041) (0.050)
Conditional difference 0.446*** 0.301*** 0.144*** 0.616*** 0.263*** 0.354***
(0.041) (0.037) (0.015) (0.046) (0.031) (0.048)
Observations 2,690 2,690 2,690 3,244 3,244 3,244
This table reports unconditional means for assigned and attended school scores, unconditional differences in scores, and the conditional difference in scores between winners and losers. “Conditional differences”
are coefficients from regressions of school quality measures on winning the lottery. The dependent variable is either the average test score at the school the student was assigned in the lottery (columns 1 and 4), the
average test score at the school the student was attending at the time of the lottery the following year (columns 2 and 5), or the difference in average test scores (assigned − attended) between the school the student
was assigned and attended (columns 3 and 6). Rows labeled “Won” display unconditional means for winners. Rows labeled “Lost” are unconditional means for lottery losers. Rows labeled “Unconditional difference”
display unconditional means in the score difference—the difference between winning and losing. Students will have a difference of 0 if they attend the school that they were assigned to in the lottery. All conditional
regressions control for lottery fixed effects, and all other lottery controls (e.g., priority groups). Lottery fixed effects are application choice-by-year indicators. Standard errors are clustered by lottery. There are 66 and
46 lotteries (program-year combinations) in the kindergarten and sixth-grade, samples, respectively.
in terms of 1 SD improvements in average school test scores
and thus provides a natural comparison with estimates based
on the boundary discontinuity approach used in the previous
literature.
V. School Quality Results: Assignment to Attendance
Table 2 highlights differences in the quality (test scores) of
assigned school based on the first-round results of the school
choice lottery relative to the school quality actually attended
in the next school year. Differences in the assignment and
attendance gaps between lottery winners and losers capture
student reactions to lottery outcomes. In particular, families
may move to gain access to a different neighborhood school,
gain access to a different school through a waiting list or
other school choice option, or simply choose not to attend the
school assigned in the lottery and attend their home (neigh-
borhood) school instead. Table 2 provides two dimensions of
insight. First, row values for “Won” and “Lost” provide un-
conditional means for average math and reading test scores
for the schools that the students were assigned to and at-
tended, as well as the difference in those two school scores.33
Columns 3 and 6 display differences in the scores of the as-
signed and attended schools, which highlights a small decline
between assigned and attended school test scores for lottery
winners but substantial improvements for losers. Second, this
table highlights the conditional differences in school quality
(test scores) for winners and losers from assignment to actual
school attended after accounting for priority group rules in
the lottery and individual-level characteristics.
A couple of elements of table 2 are interesting. First, win-
ners are clearly assigned to schools with higher test scores,
33Differences between unconditional and conditional values are simply
a result of the priority groups (e.g., economically disadvantaged, home
school is Title 1 choice) that impact lottery results. As shown in appendix
tables A2 and A3, winners and losers are not unconditionally balanced on
student attributes, but winners and losers are balanced on observables after
conditioning on lottery fixed effects and rules. Conditional means control
for these priority groups and are consistent with later regression results.
which is consistent with the nature of the school choice lot-
tery. The assignment difference, β̂as from equation (1), is
given in the “Conditional Difference” row for the assigned
column and indicates an assignment advantage of 0.45 SD for
kindergarten and 0.62 SD for sixth grade.34 This substantial
difference between winners and losers is expected, but our
analysis focuses on the changes in this difference between
assignment and the actual school attended. Columns 2 and 5
provide differences between winners and losers based on test
scores of actual school attended in the school year following
the lottery. Differences between winners and losers are now
only 0.30 and 0.26 SD for kindergarten and sixth grade stu-
dents, respectively. The large decreases are summarized in
columns 3 and 6 as difference-in-differences estimates, esti-
mates of β from equation (2), and indicate the amount of the
test score assignment gap between winners and losers that is
made up between initial assignment and attendance in the fol-
lowing year. Results show that 0.14 and 0.35 SD were made
up between assignment and attendance by kindergartners and
sixth graders, respectively.
Changes in school quality between assignment and atten-
dance in table 2 are almost entirely driven by the behavior of
losers. Kindergartners and sixth-grade winners attend schools
of similar quality as they are assigned in the lottery, which
is not surprising since 84% to 89% of lottery winners in our
sample attend their first-choice school. On the other hand,
the unconditional improvement in school quality of losers is
about 0.12 and 0.27 SD, respectively. Even though most win-
ners comply with lottery assignment, about 10% attend their
neighborhood school or another school altogether, which ex-
plains only a small portion of the decrease in the test score
gap between assignment and attendance.35 Parents may forgo
their winning lottery assignment for a number of reasons.
They may instead decide for their child to attend a school
34The initial assignment advantages for winners are equivalent to the dif-
ference between a median and 75th percentile school for both kindergartners
and sixth graders.
35The percentage of noncompliers is based on the proportion of winners
who do not attend their first-choice school minus students who left CMS.
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TABLE 3.—LOTTERY OUTCOMES, MOVING, AND SCHOOL QUALITY
Attended − Assigned Score
(Average Test Scores)
Kindergarten Sixth Grade
(1) (2)
Lottery loser
Change HS 0.224*** 0.429***
(0.024) (0.031)
Same HS 0.099*** 0.294***
(0.014) (0.053)
Lottery winner
Noncomplier × change HS −0.199*** −0.582***
(0.064) (0.102)
Noncomplier × same HS −0.199** −0.360***
(0.087) (0.098)
Observations 2,690 3,244
The omitted category is winners who complied with their assignment, for whom the outcome is 0 by
definition. All regressions are conditional on application choice by year fixed effects and all other lottery
controls. Standard errors are clustered by lottery. There are 66 and 46 lotteries (program-year combinations)
in the kindergarten and sixth-grade samples, respectively.
with his or her friends, change their preferences toward a
neighborhood school after obtaining more information, or
encounter transportation costs or other issues in accessing
the school they chose in the lottery.
A. Changes in School Quality and Moving
Table 3 follows the same intuition from table 2 but es-
timates differential effects for those who change neighbor-
hoods and those who stay in the same neighborhood after
lottery assignment.36 These results provide insight into the
role of stayers and movers in narrowing the gap in school
quality between winners and losers shown in table 2. The re-
sults in table 3 use a dependent variable that is equal to the av-
erage test score in the attended school minus the average test
score in the assigned school. Our independent variables fo-
cus on four groups: losers who move to new neighborhoods,
losers who stay, winners who move to new neighborhoods
and do not comply with lottery assignment, and winners who
stay in their neighborhood and do not comply with lottery as-
signment. Outcomes for these groups are relative to a group
that has no difference between attended and assigned school:
winners who comply with their assignment. If residential re-
location to improve school quality is the main driver of the
results in table 2, then moving should be correlated with gains
in school quality from lottery assignment to actual school
attended.
Results for kindergarten in column 1 of table 3 provide ev-
idence that losers who move (“Change HS”) are able to gen-
erate large gains in average school test scores between lottery
assignment and the following year, with this group attending
36Appendix table A4 provides the sample sizes of lottery winners and
losers by compliance, moving decision, and whether they enrolled in their
second- or third-choice school. This breakdown is helpful for interpreting
results. It also highlights that losers are 4 to 6 percentage points more likely
than winners to enroll in their second- or third-choice option, which is
consistent with participants using their second- and third-choice schools as
alternatives to neighborhood schools.
schools that score 0.22 SD higher than the schools that they
were assigned in the lottery. These results are larger for losing
sixth graders who move, a group that gains 0.43 SD between
assignment and attendance. Estimated effects for losers who
do not move are about one-half to two-thirds of those who
move, which is indicative of changing schools via follow-up
lottery assignment, accessing a non–home school via waiting
lists, or opt-out provisions based on failing schools and No
Child Left Behind education policy.37
Effects are very different for lottery winners who do not
comply with assignment. Kindergartners who win the lottery
but don’t comply with their assignment see an average de-
crease of 0.20 standard deviations in test scores between as-
signment and attendance schools, whether they change home
schools between the lotteries or not. Larger negative effects
for noncomplying winners are mostly a reflection of the
high achievement in oversubscribed schools relative to the
achievement of other public school options. Since lottery-
assigned schools are high quality, attending any school but
the lottery-assigned school will likely result in attending a
school with lower achievement than initially assigned.
The magnitude of the decrease in quality for noncomply-
ing winners in the sixth-grade sample is more substantial.
Among winners who stay in the same neighborhood school
zone but forgo their lottery assignment, the estimated de-
crease in school test scores is 0.36 SD. This result is con-
sistent with families applying to the lottery for the option
value of attending another school. Applying for the lottery
is costless, and some families may apply to magnet schools
or nonneighborhood schools with limited information but de-
cide to attend their neighborhood school after becoming more
informed about the school or transportation costs. Noncom-
plying winners who change home schools in sixth grade have
the largest decrease in school quality: −0.58 SD. These fam-
ilies may be moving for nonschool reasons (e.g., rental lease
expired, job opportunity) and thus may be less concerned
with or not able to purchase better school quality in their new
neighborhood.
Appendix tables A5 and A6 show the dimensions on which
movers and stayers differ by showing summary statistics af-
ter splitting the samples of lottery winners and losers further
into those who do and do not change neighborhood schools.
Among both lottery winners and losers, a higher proportion
of movers are black and economically disadvantaged rela-
tive to nonmovers. These results suggest that mobility may
be limited by housing tenure, with families that are econom-
ically disadvantaged moving at a higher rate. The fact that a
higher proportion of moving winners are economically dis-
advantaged relative to moving losers may represent housing
reallocation for winners who have limited benefits to mov-
ing for school quality, but want to reallocate housing and
37Billings et al. (2018) show that about 30% of children are assigned to
failing schools during a similar time period in CMS and about one-third of
students opt out to a nonneighborhood or magnet school as allowed under
NCLB.
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FIGURE 2.—DISTANCE TO ATTENDED SCHOOL: BEFORE AND AFTER MOVING
Densities of the distance (km) between the census block group of the student’s residence and the school
attended by lottery outcome at two points in time: the year of the application and the year of attendance.
Figure based on sixth-grade movers only.
neighborhood consumption. We investigate this story further
in the next section.
Additionally, appendix tables A7 and A8 examine differ-
ences between compliers and noncompliers for winners and
losers. These means help interpret the types of individuals
who are more likely to comply with lottery assignment and
thus may have different preferences or reasons for entering
the lottery. Among kindergarten lottery winners, those from
home schools with lower test scores and students who are
black are more likely to comply with assignment.38 For sixth
graders, the only difference between the student attributes of
compliers and noncompliers is in home school test scores,
with students from lower-scoring home schools more likely
to comply if they win. Across both samples, losers who com-
ply look similar to noncomplying losers. Together, these two
tables highlight that children assigned to lower-scoring home
schools are more likely to comply with winning the lot-
tery. This result is not surprising, because the realized gains
of winning the lottery are larger for applicants with lower-
performing home schools. Later results related to heterogene-
ity reinforce this point.
One other factor that may explain differences between
movers and stayers is that movers may be relocating for prox-
imity to the school they won admission to in the lottery. For
movers, figure 2 provides evidence that lottery applicants live
closer to their future attended school in the year following the
lottery, and this is due to lottery losers’ moving closer to the
school they attend in the year following lottery application,
consistent with moving to gain access to a new neighborhood
school. Figure 2 also shows limited evidence that winners are
moving to lower transportation costs of attending a nonneigh-
borhood and likely farther-away school.
38Differences in means in appendix tables A7 and A8 are not exactly equal
to the difference between compliers and noncompliers because we report
the conditional difference in means once we control for priority groups.
B. Heterogeneous Changes in School Quality
We also investigate heterogeneous effects in the changes
in school quality between assignment and attendance across
several dimensions. Specifically, we bisect our four groups
by gender, race, a dummy for economic disadvantage, home
school test score terciles, and neighborhood housing price
terciles in appendix tables A9 and A10. For kindergartners,
we see larger school quality gains for moving lottery losers
who are wealthier and white, live in low or medium school-
quality neighborhoods, and those from medium-housing-
price neighborhoods. For lottery losers who stay, results are
fairly consistent across groups. For noncomplying winners,
we see a different pattern. Poorer, nonwhite households liv-
ing in neighborhoods with lower school quality and hous-
ing prices attend schools that are considerably worse than
the average noncomplying winner. These patterns are less
pronounced for lottery losers in the sixth grade but consis-
tent with noncomplying winners in kindergarten. Altogether
these results suggest that lottery losers living in neighbor-
hoods with low school-quality assignments can drastically
improve school quality through residential relocation. The
results for noncomplying winners highlight a greater loss
in school quality for lower-income households that do not
comply. Additionally, appendix tables A11 and A12 show
that results are consistent across different types of magnet
schools and that they are similar for schools with both low-
and high-win probabilities.
Ultimately preferences over schools may depend on a num-
ber of features other than school test scores. We provide es-
timates for a number of alternative school-level attributes in
appendix tables A13 and A14. We consider changes in school
value-added, portion of students that are academically gifted,
share economically disadvantaged, share designated limited
English proficient, and percent of students who are white. Re-
sults highlight that alternative measures of school quality or
attributes generate similar qualitative results for our groups
of lottery losers and winners.
We extend this analysis further by estimating changes in
percent economically disadvantaged and percent white be-
tween assignment and attendance schools for the four groups
of applicants while controlling for changes in test scores in
appendix tables A15 and A16. This additional analysis is in-
formative for current policy debates about school choice lot-
teries and the role of lotteries in promoting or discouraging
economic and racial diversity, because residential mobility
in response to lottery outcomes may have an impact on the
composition of schools. We provide two sets of results for
each outcome. Columns 1 and 3 replicate our main analysis,
replacing changes in average test scores with the two addi-
tional characteristics. Columns 2 and 4, which control for
changes in school average test scores, provide the main in-
sight. The results for kindergartners suggest that lottery losers
move to schools with a lower percentage of economically
disadvantaged students and a higher percentage of white stu-
dents, even after controlling for school quality. We see similar
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TABLE 4.—HEDONIC PRICING OF SCHOOL QUALITY
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avg. Elem. Test Scores (t − 1) 0.2884*** 0.1296*** 0.0717*** 0.0412 0.0771***
(0.0054) (0.0106) (0.0130) (0.0323) (0.0225)
Avg. Elem. Test Scores (t − 1)∗
2nd Qt. Neigh Test Scores −0.0216
(0.0367)
3rd Qt. Neigh Test Scores −0.0263
(0.0306)
4th Qt. Neigh Test Scores 0.1037**
(0.0454)
R2 0.7388 0.7891 0.8003 0.8441 0.8003
Observations 81,186 81,186 81,186 81,186 81,186
Tract FEs –
√
– – –
CBG FEs – –
√
–
√
Block FEs – – –
√
–
Regressions of log(price) on neighborhood school quality for Mecklenburg County home sales. Basic controls include structural attributes for age, building area, lot size, number of bathrooms, indicator for fireplace,
and indicators for building material/structure types. Neighborhood controls include Census Block Group (CBG) 2000 median household income, population density, percent unemployed, indicator for floodplain,
indicator for on a busy road, distance to CBG, distance to highway, and distance to park. All models include year-by-quarter fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the CBG level. Includes only arm’s-length
transactions of between $10,000 and $1 million for properties sold between 2007 and 2013. “Neigh” school quality quartiles based on quartiles of CBG minimum state standardized tests (mean zero, standard deviation 1).
effects for noncompliers who win. These results suggest that
some of the postlottery sorting among kindergarten students
may influence student composition. These results are weaker
for movers in the sixth grade and may indicate less race- and
income-based residential sorting for students with prior ex-
posure to public schools. Among sixth-grade applicants, stu-
dents who lose the lottery and remain in the same home school
attend schools with a higher proportion of economically dis-
advantaged students and a lower proportion of white students
than their initial assignment. However, winning sixth-grade
applicants who do not move and do not comply attend schools
with a lower proportion of economically disadvantaged stu-
dents and a higher proportion of white students than they
were initially assigned.
VI. Housing Prices and School Quality Results
Given higher relocation rates to neighborhoods with
higher-quality schools for lottery losers, we test whether
housing prices reflect neighborhood school quality and then
directly link changes in school quality to differences across
neighborhood property values. Given the range of estimates
in the literature on valuation of school quality, we first provide
a hedonic-based estimate of the value of school quality using
a boundary discontinuity design. Table 4 provides hedonic es-
timates of the impact of a 1 SD increase in one-year-lagged
school average test scores on housing prices. We present es-
timates from four specifications with different controls for
structural and neighborhood attributes. As we include pro-
gressively smaller Census 2000 geography fixed effects, our
approach mimics a boundary discontinuity design by limit-
ing identification to differences in sale prices of homes that
are in the same census geography, but on opposite sides of
an elementary school attendance zone that bisects that cen-
sus geography. Although we provide estimates for a smaller
geography, our preferred estimate includes the larger CBG
fixed effects, because this is the finest level of location data
that we have for the students in our sample. Our preferred es-
timates suggest that a 1 SD increase in test scores generates
a 7% increase in housing prices, which is in the higher range
of previous estimates in other school districts.39
To examine potential nonlinearities in the valuation of
school quality, in the final column of table 4, we use the
boundary discontinuity design to estimate heterogeneous val-
uations based on quartiles of school quality. These estimates
are for the percent increase in housing prices for a 1 SD in-
crease in test scores for each quartile of neighborhood school
quality relative to the lowest neighborhood school quality.40
The estimated valuations are similar in the bottom three
quartiles, but increase to 18% for the highest-school-quality
neighborhoods. The top quartile of school-quality neighbor-
hoods contains similar test scores as the destination CBG of
a number of our lottery losers.
Next, we focus on estimating the value of school quality
in our sample of lottery applicants. In the first step, we av-
erage home price residuals to the neighborhood level using
the sample of housing transactions in table 4. This provides a
fixed measure of neighborhood school quality across all the
years of the lottery and does not account for any impacts
of neighborhood prices due to our small group of lottery
movers. We regress the natural log of prices on structural
and neighborhood attributes, and average the residuals up
to the neighborhood level. For the sample of rising kinder-
garten students, the elementary school attendance zone is the
smallest geographical area of residence that we can place the
lottery applicants in, so their assigned neighborhood price
39The literature finds a range of estimates between 2% and 10% with
more recent estimates falling in the 2% to 4% range. The fact that we find a
7% premium for a 1 SD increase in test scores is consistent with our study
area, which contains a large range of school quality within the same school
district. The average housing price in our sample of all single-family homes
with transacted sales between 2007 and 2013 is $226,752.
40We calculate quartiles based on the lowest average school test score for
a given neighborhood, which allows discontinuities in test scores within a
CBG and within each quartile.
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TABLE 5.—LOTTERY OUTCOMES, MOVING, AND HOUSING PRICES
HS(t + 1) − HS(t ) Price Residuals
Kindergarten Kindergarten Sixth Grade Sixth Grade Sixth Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lost × Change HS 0.082*** 0.041** 0.080*** 0.060*** 0.051***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017)
Winners × Change HS
Complier 0.059** 0.044* 0.054 0.032 0.058*
(0.029) (0.024) (0.042) (0.033) (0.031)
Noncomplier 0.045 0.017 0.044 0.042 0.057
(0.035) (0.034) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048)
Destination CBG FE – – – –
√
1st-stage Neigh controls –
√
–
√ √
Observations 2,690 2,690 3,244 3,244 3,084
All regressions include application choice-by-year fixed effects and other controls. The dependent variable is the change in the average neighborhood home price residual aggregated to either the home school level
(for kindergarten sample) or home school-by-CBG level (for sixth-grade sample) for students who changed home schools between lotteries. The omitted category is all applicants who had the same home school in
both the applicant and following year. The last column includes CBG fixed effects for the CBG that the student was in for the year following the lottery. The drop in observations in the final column is due to missing
data on CBG and dropping singleton sets of the absorbed set of fixed effects, that is, lottery and destination CBG. Standard errors are clustered by lottery. “1st-Stage Neigh Controls” are the same as the basic and
neighborhood controls used in table 3.
residuals are at the neighborhood school zone level. For the
sample of rising sixth graders, we average to the attendance
zone by CBG level.41
Table 5 reports estimates of changes in neighborhood price
residuals from assignment to attendance for three groups:
movers who lose, movers who win and comply with lottery
assignment, and winners who move but do not comply with
their lottery assignment.42 The omitted group is nonmovers
who by construction do not have a change in neighborhood
price residuals. The first column for each sample omits neigh-
borhood controls in the first stage, but columns 2 and 4 include
these controls. For the sixth-grade sample, we further refine
our estimates by conditioning on destination CBG fixed ef-
fects, and these estimates are shown in column 5 of table 5. All
groups exhibit some positive price premium relative to non-
movers, but the estimates for lottery losers are more precise
and often larger than for lottery winners. Table 5 estimates
show that lottery losers who move pay a 4.1% and 5.1% pre-
mium in housing prices for kindergartners and sixth graders,
respectively, highlighting that movers relocate to neighbor-
hoods with higher-quality schools. Winners who comply with
assignment and move tend to relocate to neighborhoods with
a smaller and less precise premium for school quality, but
conclusions are somewhat limited by the small sample size
of winners who move. From earlier results, winners did not
appear to move closer to their attended school, and thus any
incurred price premiums for winners may simply be housing
consumption reallocation to nicer neighborhoods.
To test the importance of neighborhood appreciation and
the bargaining power of lottery movers, we estimate different
versions of table 5 in appendix tables A17 and A18 in which
we focus on changes in neighborhood housing price residuals.
Specifically, we use changes in residuals from the application
year (t − 1) to attendance year (t), and attendance year (t) to
41NCERDC address data include the CBG of student residence, but cov-
erage is adequate only in the sixth-grade sample.
42All estimates in table 5 use the same controls as all of our previous
tables on changes in school quality.
the following year (t + 1) for a mover’s destination neigh-
borhood, as the outcomes. As shown in appendix table A17,
we estimate that the neighborhoods that lottery losers move
to are not appreciating at a different rate than other neigh-
borhoods are. In appendix table A18, we estimate greater de-
preciation in the new neighborhoods of kindergarten lottery
winners who complied with assignment in the year following
the lottery. However, there are only three significant coeffi-
cients across these two tables with thirty coefficients total,
which generally alleviates concerns that loser and winners
are moving to different types of neighborhoods based on prior
or expected appreciation. Additionally, these results provide
little support that the immediate need for losers to move into a
higher-school-quality neighborhood leads to a poor bargain-
ing position and a higher transacted home price. Of course,
using neighborhood price residual aggregates limits our abil-
ity to rule out this explanation, but the results suggest that the
high values of school quality are more likely due to nonlin-
ear premiums in school quality (shown in table 4) as lottery
losers try and gain access to high-quality home schools.
In order to directly test whether changes in neighbor-
hood prices map to changes in school quality, we inter-
act the dummy variable for each group by the change in
(attended − assigned) test scores. Table 6 provides results for
these two groups, with the omitted group being nonmovers,
and highlights the price premium for lottery losers in kinder-
garten and sixth grade. Estimates without controls for neigh-
borhood quality are shown in columns 1 and 3, which esti-
mate a relatively high value of school quality. Our preferred
estimates include neighborhood controls and are shown in
columns 2 and 4. Based on this specification, we estimate
that lottery losers move to neighborhoods with an 11% price
premium for elementary school and a 13% price premium
for middle school for a 1 SD increase in test scores. For our
sixth-grade sample, we include estimates from an additional
specification in which we include destination CBG fixed ef-
fects. In the sixth-grade sample, the neighborhood residuals
are at the CBG by school attendance zone. By including CBG
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TABLE 6.—LOTTERY OUTCOMES, MOVING, AND HOUSING PRICES II
HS(t + 1) − HS(t ) Price Residuals
Kindergarten Kindergarten Sixth Grade Sixth Grade Sixth Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change HS × Score Diff
Lost 0.238*** 0.112*** 0.155*** 0.128*** 0.090***
(0.038) (0.034) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028)
Won × Noncomplier 0.010 −0.019 −0.003 −0.008 −0.007
(0.084) (0.084) (0.069) (0.064) (0.069)
Destination CBG FE – – – –
√
1st-Stage Neigh Controls –
√
–
√ √
Observations 2,690 2,690 3,244 3,244 3,084
Same as table 3 but uses interactions of all “Lottery Outcome” × Moving” dummies with the change in school average test scores (attended − assigned) to scale the estimates according to a one standard deviation
change in school quality.
fixed effects, we are identifying the school quality value esti-
mates from the subset of destination CBGs that are bisected
by school attendance zones. These estimates are shown in
the last column of table 6. We estimate that lottery losers in
the sixth-grade sample move to neighborhoods that are 9%
more expensive per 1 SD increase in average test scores. In
all specifications, winners who do not comply experience a
noisy and near-zero relationship between incurred changes in
school quality and changes in neighborhood housing prices.
This result shows that changes in school quality are corre-
lated only with changes in neighborhood housing prices for
lottery losers and supports the idea that lottery winners are
moving for nonneighborhood school-quality reasons.
Appendix table A19 extends the results on the kindergarten
sample to examine whether estimates for the value of school
quality for losers and winners who move vary by gender,
race, economic disadvantage, school test score terciles, and
neighborhood housing price terciles. We focus our discus-
sion on losers since we have only a small sample of moving
winners who do not comply with lottery assignment, so the
related results are imprecise. In most subgroups, there is lim-
ited heterogeneity among losers, but we do estimate a larger
and more precise effect for students who are wealthier (not
economically disadvantaged). Turning to rising sixth graders
in appendix table A20, we again find limited heterogeneity in
our price effects, but do find some evidence of heterogeneous
effects by school quality and average neighborhood housing
price. In these two sets of terciles, we find no price effect for
households moving out of more expensive and higher-quality
neighborhoods based on residence at the time of lottery ap-
plications. This suggests that families with relatively good
home school options are less willing to pay for access to bet-
ter home schools, especially in sixth grade, with a shorter
time span to realize the potential benefits of an improved
home school.
Appendix tables A21 and A22 examine heterogeneity by
the type of magnet school program and the probability of
winning the lottery. Most effects are similar across different
types of oversubscribed schools. However, there is notable
heterogeneity related to how oversubscribed the lottery is:
more oversubscribed (p < 0.5) versus less oversubscribed
(p ≥ 0.5). Applicants to less oversubscribed schools gener-
ate larger estimates of the value of school quality than ap-
plicants to more oversubscribed schools. This result suggests
that students who lose unexpectedly (p ≥ 0.5) pay a higher
premium for access to a higher-quality school, which could
result from a more immediate need or higher willingness to
pay for an increase in quality among this group. This premium
is also higher in the kindergarten sample, which is consistent
with the longer potential stream of benefits from accessing a
higher-quality school.
VII. Conclusion
We examine the responses of school choice lottery losers,
with a primary focus on residential relocation and opting out
of the public school system in response to the results of a
school choice lottery. Despite a large literature on the bene-
fits to lottery winners, little is known about the behavior of
losers who need to compensate for the lower-quality school
assignment, a population that may be incurring substantial
costs to improve school quality. We show that rising kinder-
gartners and sixth-grade students who lose a school choice
lottery are about 6 percentage points more likely to exit the
district or change neighborhood schools, an increase of about
30% over baseline moving probabilities. Lottery losers are
assigned to schools with substantially lower average perfor-
mance on end-of-grade exams, but those who lost the lottery
and change neighborhood schools make up 0.22 to 0.43 SD in
average school test scores between lottery assignment and at-
tendance the following year. Using hedonic-based estimates
of land prices, we estimate a housing price premium of 9%
to 11% for a 1 SD increase in school test scores.
Results provide two new insights. First, we estimate how
much of the gap in school quality is made up by lottery losers
through residential relocation. Second, we provide a new es-
timate of the value of school quality by examining incurred
home price differentials for losers to improve school quality
after losing the school choice lottery. Together, these find-
ings provide insight into the potential benefits to expanding
popular school choice options to minimize the number of
families denied access to oversubscribed schools. Consistent
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with Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2005), our large estimates
of the value of school quality point to substantial hetero-
geneity in how families value school quality, suggesting that
families with strong school preference and worse-performing
neighborhood schools likely have nonlinear or high marginal
benefits from gaining access to a high-quality school.
Given that most U.S. states now use some form of school
choice (Brunner et al., 2012; Tuttle, Gleason, & Clark, 2012),
our results have some level of generalizability. The degree
to which we expect our results to reflect the experience of
other districts may depend on the size and composition of
the population, the specifics of the school choice system,
and choice options. For example, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and
Raleigh are more likely to generate similar effects to Charlotte
given similar student composition and focus on intradistrict
school choice (Cullen et al., 2006; Engberg et al., 2014; Dur,
Hammond, & Morrill, 2018). In contrast, New Orleans and
Detroit contain school lotteries and open enrollment across
all schools, thereby limiting the link between school assign-
ment and residential location (Harris & Larsen, 2015; Glaz-
erman & Dotter, 2017).43 Many other school choice systems
fall somewhere between these cities, with some residential-
based assignments paired with a variety of school choice
options (e.g., Boston; Washington, DC; Denver). From our
results, school systems with a higher concentration of lower-
quality neighborhood schools and fewer economically dis-
advantaged applicants will generate larger residential sorting
responses from lottery losers, but responses will be muted in
systems with more parity in school quality and weaker links
between residential location and school assignment. Regard-
less of school choice systems, our results highlighting large
costs incurred by lottery losers to improve school quality
suggest that there may be substantial returns to public in-
vestments that expand access to high-quality or specialized
magnet school programs.
43Schwartz et al. (2014) provide evidence that expanded school choice
leads to smaller property value effects for residentially assigned school
quality.
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